We design a field experiment to study how the allocation of authority between frontline procurement officers and their monitors affects performance both directly and through the response to incentives. In collaboration with the government of Punjab, Pakistan, we shift authority from monitors to procurement officers and introduce financial incentives in a sample of 600 procurement officers in 26 districts. We find that autonomy alone reduces prices by 9% without reducing quality and that the effect is stronger when the monitor tends to delay approvals for purchases until the end of the fiscal year. In contrast, the effect of performance pay is muted, except when agents face a monitor who does not delay approvals. Time use data reveal agents’ responses vary along the same margin: autonomy increases the time devoted to procurement, and this leads to lower prices only when monitors cause delays. By contrast, incentives work when monitors do not cause delays. The results illustrate that organizational design and anti-corruption policies must balance agency issues at different levels of the hierarchy.

中文翻译：

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组织中的权力分配：官僚的实地试验*

我们设计了一项实地实验，以研究一线采购官员及其监督人员之间的权力分配如何直接影响绩效，并通过对激励措施的反应来影响绩效。我们与巴基斯坦旁遮普省政府合作，将权力从监督员转移到采购员，并在 26 个地区的 600 名采购员样本中引入了经济激励措施。我们发现，仅自治一项就可以在不降低质量的情况下将价格降低 9%，并且当监管者倾向于将采购审批推迟到财政年度结束时，效果会更强。相比之下，绩效工资的影响很小，除非座席面对不延迟批准的监督员。时间使用数据显示代理商的反应在相同的幅度上有所不同：自主性增加了用于采购的时间，只有当显示器造成延迟时，这才会导致价格降低。相比之下，当监督员不会造成延误时，激励措施就会奏效。结果表明，组织设计和反腐败政策必须平衡不同层次结构的机构问题。