ABSTRACT

Vladimir Putin’s personal popularity creates the base for sociopolitical stability of regime. However, in the long term, the aspirations of Russia’s elite for national sovereignty will come to naught without anew economic development model. Applying the “limited access orders” framework of North, Wallis, and Weingast, this essay analyzes the interactions among three key groups in the ruling elite# the top federal bureaucracy, politically connected big business (oligarchs), and heads of security forces (siloviki). It considers the evolution of rent sources in Russia during the last 25 years and the incentives of elite groups. Itargues that under dominance of siloviki after 2012, the ruling coalition could not negotiate anew agreement on rent distribution, nor could it broaden access to economic opportunities and political activity for new social groups. Russia’s ruling elite missed the opportunity to avoid adeep shock that will likely destroy the existing “limited access order”.

摘要

弗拉基米尔·普京的个人声望为政权的社会政治稳定奠定了基础。然而，从长远来看，如果没有新的经济发展模式，俄罗斯精英对国家主权的渴望将化为泡影。本文运用 North、Wallis 和 Weingast 的“有限准入令”框架，分析了统治精英中三个关键群体#联邦最高官僚机构、政治上有关联的大企业（寡头）和安全部队负责人（siloviki）之间的相互作用。 ）。它考虑了过去 25 年俄罗斯租金来源的演变以及精英群体的激励措施。Itargues 在 2012 年之后 siloviki 的统治下，执政联盟无法就租金分配谈判新的协议，它也不能扩大新社会群体获得经济机会和政治活动的机会。俄罗斯的统治精英错过了避免深度冲击的机会，这可能会破坏现有的“有限准入秩序”。