This paper considers a hidden action agency model in which an agent can be incentivized to simultaneously work and exert effort to increase productivity. When such multitasking is optimal, it is implemented through a higher powered contract, unlike the standard multitasking case. We determine conditions under which the principal wants to incentivize concurrent working and productivity investment and conditions under which the agent would want to participate. We show that these conditions are not the same. Multitasking is compared to separated tasks. Our results can help explain the skills gap.

中文翻译：

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隐藏行动的生产力投资

本文考虑了一种隐藏的行动代理模型，其中可以激励代理同时工作并努力提高生产力。与标准的多任务处理情况不同，当这种多任务处理是最佳的时，它是通过更高功率的合约来实现的。我们确定委托人希望激励并发工作和生产力投资的条件以及代理人希望参与的条件。我们表明这些条件是不一样的。将多任务与分离的任务进行比较。我们的结果可以帮助解释技能差距。