ABSTRACT

When a company becomes factually insolvent but it is not yet subject to a formal insolvency proceeding, the shareholders - or the directors acting on their behalf - may engage, even in good faith, in various forms of behaviour that can divert or destroy value at the expense of the creditors. For this reason, many jurisdictions impose special directors’ duties in the zone of insolvency. From a sample of more than 25 countries from North America, Europe, Latin America, Africa, Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific, this article seeks to explore the most common regulatory models of directors’ duties in the zone of insolvency existing around the world. It concludes by providing various policy recommendations to design directors’ duties in the zone of insolvency across jurisdictions taking into account international divergences in corporate ownership structures, debt structures, level of financial development, efficiency of insolvency proceedings, and sophistication of the judiciary.

摘要

当一家公司实际上破产但尚未进入正式破产程序时，股东或代表他们行事的董事可能会采取各种形式的行为，即使是出于善意，也可能会转移或破坏公司价值。债权人的费用。出于这个原因，许多司法管辖区在破产区规定了特别董事的职责。本文以北美、欧洲、拉丁美洲、非洲、中东和亚太地区超过 25 个国家的样本为样本，旨在探讨在破产区现有的董事职责最常见的监管模式。世界。