We measure the marginal effects of two crucial dimensions of the Investment Game design of Gneezy and Potters (1997, GP97) and its replications: time frequency and time horizon. To this aim, we randomize between subjects five different time frequencies: 1 round (“High Frequency” in GP97), 3 rounds (“Low Frequency”), but also 6, 9 and 12 rounds. As for time horizon, we compare the baseline GP97 horizon (9 rounds) with smaller (3 and 6 rounds), but also higher (12 rounds) alternatives. We find that, holding the time horizon constant, subjects invest more when they evaluate their investments less frequently, but this result is significant only when time horizon is sufficiently long. We also find that lower frequencies increase the marginal investment at a decreasing rate. As for time horizon, we find that, holding time frequency constant, the higher the horizon, the lower the investment (although, as in the previous case, investment lowers at a decreasing rate). Our reduced form results also show that subjects’ behavior is sensitive to the endowment stock provided along the experiment, independently of time frequency.

我们测量了 Gneezy 和 Potters (1997, GP97) 的投资博弈设计的两个关键维度及其复制品的边际效应：时间频率和时间范围。为此，我们在受试者之间随机分配五个不同的时间频率：1 轮（GP97 中的“高频”）、3 轮（“低频”），以及 6、9 和 12 轮。至于时间范围，我们将基线 GP97 范围（9 轮）与较小（3 和 6 轮）但也较高（12 轮）的替代方案进行比较。我们发现，在保持时间跨度不变的情况下，受试者在评估投资的频率较低时投资更多，但只有当时间跨度足够长时，这一结果才显着。我们还发现，较低的频率以递减的速度增加边际投资。至于时间范围，我们发现，在保持时间频率不变的情况下，时间范围越高，投资越低（尽管与前一种情况一样，投资以递减的速度下降）。我们的简化形式的结果还表明，受试者的行为对实验中提供的禀赋存量很敏感，与时间频率无关。