The foundation of W. Matthews Grant's project in Free Will and God's Universal Causality is his Non-Occasionalist version of Divine Universal Causality (NODUC), which affirms the traditional concurrentist idea that God and secondary causes cooperate non-superfluously in such a way that they both produce the entire effect. Grant defends NODUC's concurrentist account by responding to ‘The Metaphysical Objection’, which alleges that concurrentism places an inconsistent set of demands upon secondary causes. I argue that Grant's responses to that objection are unconvincing, and thus, he fails to demonstrate that NODUC is a stable foundation for the rest of his project.

W. Matthews Grant 在自由意志和上帝的普遍因果关系中的项目的基础是他的非偶然版本的神圣普遍因果关系（NODUC），它肯定了传统的并发主义观点，即上帝和次要原因以非多余的方式合作两者都会产生整体效果。格兰特通过回应“形而上学的异议”来捍卫 NODUC 的并发论者的说法，该论点声称并发论对次要原因提出了一系列不一致的要求。我认为格兰特对这一反对意见的回应没有说服力，因此，他未能证明 NODUC 是他项目其余部分的稳定基础。