Prawitz has recently developed a theory of epistemic grounding that differs in many respects from his earlier semantics of arguments and proofs. An innovative approach to (valid) inferences yields a new conception of the intertwinement of the notions of valid inference and proof. We aim at singling out three reasons that may have led Prawitz to the ground-theoretic turn, i.e.: a better order in the explanation of the relation between valid inferences and proofs; a notion of valid inference based on which valid inferences and proofs are recognisable as such; a reconstruction of the deductive activity that makes inferences capable of yielding justification per se. These topics are discussed by Prawitz with reference to a very general and ancient question: why and how correct deduction has the epistemic power to compel us to accept its conclusions, provided its premises are justified? We conclude by remarking that, in spite of some improvements, the ground-theoretic approach shares with the previous one a problem of vacuous validity which, as Prawitz himself points out, blocks in both cases a satisfactory explanation of epistemic compulsion.

Prawitz 最近发展了一种认知基础理论，该理论在许多方面与他早期的论证和证明语义不同。（有效）推理的创新方法产生了有效推理和证明概念交织的新概念。我们的目标是找出可能导致 Prawitz 转向基础理论的三个原因，即： 在解释有效推论和证明之间的关系时更好的顺序；有效推理的概念，基于该概念，有效的推理和证明是可识别的；对演绎活动的重构，使推理本身能够产生正当性。Prawitz 参考一个非常普遍和古老的问题讨论了这些主题：为什么以及如何正确的演绎具有迫使我们接受其结论的认知力量，如果其前提是合理的？我们最后评论说，尽管有一些改进，但基础理论方法与前一种方法共有一个空洞有效性问题，正如普拉维茨自己指出的那样，这在两种情况下都阻碍了对认知强迫的令人满意的解释。