We explore how discretion over fair value measurement affects the comparability of fair value estimates in the financial industry. We find that greater exposure to Level 2 (Level 3) measurement enhances (diminishes) the comparability of fair value estimates across firms. These contrasting results reflect a nuanced relation between discretion over fair value measurement and comparability and suggest that managers convey useful information through Level 2 estimates, whereas Level 3 measurement is subject to error and managerial opportunism. Cross-sectional analyses show that fair value estimates are less comparable when managers have stronger incentives to introduce discretion and more comparable when investor monitoring is stronger. Additional analyses demonstrate that the comparability of fair value estimates is negatively associated with non-agency mortgage backed security holdings, the asset class most likely to be held at Level 3 by our sample firms, and that our primary results hold for alternative measures of comparability. Taken together, our results highlight the critical role of discretion in shaping the comparability of fair value estimates.

我们探讨了公允价值计量的自由裁量权如何影响金融行业公允价值估计的可比性。我们发现，更大程度地暴露于第 2 级（第 3 级）计量会提高（降低）公司间公允价值估计的可比性。这些对比结果反映了公允价值计量的自由裁量权与可比性之间的微妙关系，并表明管理人员通过第 2 级估计传达有用的信息，而第 3 级计量容易出现错误和管理机会主义。横断面分析表明，当管理者有更强的动机引入自由裁量权时，公允价值估计的可比性较低，而当投资者监控更强时，公允价值估计的可比性更高。其他分析表明，公允价值估计的可比性与非机构抵押支持证券持有负相关，我们的样本公司最有可能持有的资产类别为 3 级，我们的主要结果适用于可比性的替代衡量标准。总而言之，我们的结果强调了自由裁量权在塑造公允价值估计可比性方面的关键作用。