We examine the effect of restricting executives’ outside job opportunities on corporate tax avoidance and tax risk, using a natural experiment of the staggered adoption and rejection of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD). Based on a difference-in-differences analysis, we find strong evidence that the IDD decreases effective tax rates. We also find that the IDD reduces tax risk though the evidence is weaker. The effect is generally more pronounced when the risk of dismissal due to poor performance is higher. Additional analyses show that the IDD increases the use of tax haven operations. Finally, a path analysis shows that the increase in tax avoidance contributes about 6% to 7% of the total effect of the IDD on firm value. Overall, the results suggest that career concerns motivate executives to reduce their firms’ tax burden using low risk strategies.

我们使用交错采用和拒绝不可避免的披露原则 (IDD) 的自然实验来检验限制高管的外部工作机会对公司避税和税收风险的影响。基于差异分析，我们发现强有力的证据表明 IDD 降低了有效税率。我们还发现，尽管证据较弱，但 IDD 降低了税收风险。当因绩效不佳而被解雇的风险较高时，这种影响通常更为明显。其他分析表明，IDD 增加了避税港业务的使用。最后，路径分析表明，避税的增加在 IDD 对公司价值的总影响中贡献了大约 6% 到 7%。全面的，