This paper critically examines the proposal to overcome the judicial definition of fundamental rights by using constitutional amendment procedures. Authors known as “political constitutionalists” have advocated weak-form judicial review as an alternative to the constitutional practice currently prevailing in liberal democracies. The proposal under consideration here seeks to achieve this alternative by making constitutional amendment as easy as possible, i.e., through minimal constitutional rigidity. The discussion begins by questioning the idea of adopting institutional design as a suitable criterion for rating a judicial review system as “strong” or “weak.” Then the alleged relevance of constitutional amendment in the specification of constitutional rights is called into question. Lastly, the paper reaches a double conclusion. On the one hand, minimal constitutional rigidity is not an alternative to prevailing constitutional practice, but a more collaborative version of the same practice; on the other hand, minimal constitutional rigidity only represents a genuine alternative design when it is part of a model (“strong popular sovereignty”) aimed at overcoming the current constitutionalist paradigm.

中文翻译：

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通过宪法修正案克服司法至上：一些批判性思考*

本文批判性地审查了通过使用宪法修改程序来克服基本权利的司法定义的建议。被称为“政治立宪主义者”的作者主张弱形式的司法审查作为目前在自由民主国家盛行的宪法实践的替代方案。这里正在考虑的提案试图通过使宪法修正案尽可能容易，即通过最小化宪法僵化来实现这一替代方案。讨论首先质疑采用制度设计作为将司法审查制度评为“强”或“弱”的合适标准的想法。然后，宪法修正案在宪法权利规范中的所谓相关性受到质疑。最后，论文得出了双重结论。一方面，最低限度的宪法僵化不是现行宪法实践的替代方案，而是同一实践的更具协作性的版本；另一方面，最低限度的宪法刚性仅代表一种真正的替代设计，当它是旨在克服当前宪政范式的模型（“强大的人民主权”）的一部分时。