This paper presents a distinctively metaphysical version of the problem of other minds. The main source of this version of the problem lies in the principle that, when it comes to consciousness, no distinction can sensibly be drawn between appearance and reality. I will argue that, unless we want to call that principle into question, we should seriously consider the possibility of accepting the conclusion that other minds are not like our own. This option is less problematic than it might seem at first if we are willing to reconceive facts of consciousness as subjective rather than objective in nature.

中文翻译：

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其他思想的形而上学问题

本文提出了一个独特的形而上学版本的其他思想问题。这个版本的问题的主要根源在于这样一个原则，即当涉及到意识时，无法在外观和现实之间做出明智的区分。我会争辩说，除非我们想质疑该原则，否则我们应该认真考虑接受其他思想与我们自己的思想不同的结论的可能性。如果我们愿意将意识的事实重新理解为主观的而不是客观的，那么这个选项的问题并不像起初看起来那样成问题。