In this paper, we examine the interaction between a retailer’s information acquisition and a manufacturer’s advertising strategies by incorporating the advertising threshold effect under manufacturer encroachment. We elaborate on two acquisition timings, namely, ex ante acquisition and ex post acquisition, depending on whether the retailer makes the information acquisition decision before or after the manufacturer’s advertising decision. We demonstrate that under ex ante acquisition, the retailer’s acquisition incentive and the manufacturer’s optimal advertising level exhibit a non-monotonic relationship with the advertising threshold. Under ex post acquisition, given that the threshold is not too high, the retailer’s acquisition incentive weakly increases with the advertising threshold, and the optimal advertising level is always pushed up by the advertising threshold effect and the acquisition inducing effect. More importantly, the advertising threshold effect does not necessarily hurt (benefit) the manufacturer (retailer), as the information acquisition effect can conditionally alleviate the detrimental effect of the advertising threshold. Moreover, the retailer may prefer either ex ante acquisition or ex post acquisition, depending on the advertising level comparison. By contrast, the manufacturer prefers ex post acquisition only when the acquisition incentive under ex post acquisition is higher than that under ex ante acquisition; otherwise, the manufacturer always weakly prefers ex ante acquisition.

在本文中，我们通过结合制造商侵占下的广告阈值效应来研究零售商的信息获取与制造商的广告策略之间的相互作用。我们详细阐述了两种获取时机，即事前获取和事后获取，这取决于零售商是在制造商的广告决策之前还是之后做出信息获取决策。我们证明了在事前收购下，零售商的收购激励和制造商的最优广告水平与广告阈值呈现非单调关系。在事后收购下，考虑到门槛不是太高，零售商的收购激励随着广告门槛的增加而微弱地增加，而最优的广告水平总是被广告门槛效应和获取诱导效应推高。更重要的是，广告门槛效应并不一定会伤害（受益）制造商（零售商），因为信息获取效应可以有条件地缓解广告门槛的不利影响。此外，零售商可能更喜欢事前收购或事后收购，这取决于广告水平的比较。相比之下，只有在事后收购的收购激励高于事前收购的情况下，制造商才会倾向于事后收购；否则，制造商总是较弱地倾向于事前收购。广告门槛效应并不一定会伤害（受益）制造商（零售商），因为信息获取效应可以有条件地缓解广告门槛的不利影响。此外，零售商可能更喜欢事前收购或事后收购，这取决于广告水平的比较。相比之下，只有在事后收购的收购激励高于事前收购的情况下，制造商才会倾向于事后收购；否则，制造商总是较弱地倾向于事前收购。广告门槛效应并不一定会伤害（受益）制造商（零售商），因为信息获取效应可以有条件地缓解广告门槛的不利影响。此外，零售商可能更喜欢事前收购或事后收购，这取决于广告水平的比较。相比之下，只有在事后收购的收购激励高于事前收购的情况下，制造商才会倾向于事后收购；否则，制造商总是较弱地倾向于事前收购。取决于广告级别比较。相比之下，只有在事后收购的收购激励高于事前收购的情况下，制造商才会倾向于事后收购；否则，制造商总是较弱地倾向于事前收购。取决于广告级别比较。相比之下，只有在事后收购的收购激励高于事前收购的情况下，制造商才会倾向于事后收购；否则，制造商总是较弱地倾向于事前收购。