This research examines the effects of input price discrimination on allocation efficiency and social welfare. Instead of assuming constant marginal costs, we allow downstream firms to produce under increasing marginal costs. When downstream firms operate in separate markets, even though total output remains unchanged, consumer surplus and social welfare could be greater under discriminatory pricing than under uniform pricing. Moreover, the social desirability of input price discrimination can still hold true when downstream firms compete either in Cournot or Bertrand fashion.

中文翻译：

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投入价格歧视和分配效率

本研究考察了投入价格歧视对配置效率和社会福利的影响。我们不假设边际成本不变，而是允许下游企业在边际成本增加的情况下进行生产。当下游企业在不同的市场经营时，即使总产量保持不变，在歧视性定价下消费者剩余和社会福利可能比在统一定价下更大。此外，当下游企业以古诺或伯特兰方式进行竞争时，投入品价格歧视的社会愿望仍然成立。