This paper extends Williamson’s (1968, 58(1):p. 18–36) classic framework of the welfare effect of mergers to the case of vertical mergers, and in particular to those in which the imposition of merger conditions (remedies) may allow an otherwise anticompetitive merger to proceed. While similarities to the case of horizontal mergers without a remedies option are present, differences also arise. Most notably: For prototypical vertical mergers, remedies may yield post–merger economic welfare that is higher than pre–merger levels. This suggests that remedies that are directed toward vertical mergers hold the promise of a more beneficial approach than in the case of horizontal mergers.

本文将 Williamson (1968, 58(1):p. 18–36) 的经典合并福利效应框架扩展到纵向合并的情况，特别是那些合并条件（补救措施）可能允许的情况否则将进行反竞争合并。虽然存在与没有补救选项的横向合并案例的相似之处，但也存在差异。最值得注意的是：对于典型的垂直合并，补救措施可能会产生高于合并前水平的合并后经济福利。这表明，针对纵向合并的补救措施有望比横向合并提供更有益的方法。