Subjective language has attracted substantial attention in the recent literature in formal semantics and philosophy of language (see overviews in MacFarlane in Assessment sensitivity: relative truth and its applications, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014; van Wijnbergen-Huitink, in Meier, and van Wijnbergen-Huitink (eds) Subjective meaning: alternatives to relativism, De Gruyter, Berlin, pp 1–19, 2016; Lasersohn in Subjectivity and perspective in truth-theoretic semantics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017; Vardomskaya in Sources of subjectivity, Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, IL, 2018; Zakkou in Faultless disagreement: a defense of contextualism in the realm of personal taste, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M., 2019b). Most current theories argue that Subjective Predicates (SPs), which express matters of opinion, semantically differ from ordinary predicates, which express matters of fact. We will call this view “SP exceptionalism”. This paper addresses SP exceptionalism by scrutinizing the behavior of SPs in attitude reports, which, as we will argue, significantly constrains the space of analytical options and rules out some of the existing theories. As first noticed by Stephenson (Linguist Philos 30(4):487–525, 2007a; Towards a theory of subjective meaning, Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, 2007b), the most prominent reading of embedded SPs is one where they talk about the attitude holder’s subjective judgment. As is remarked sometimes (Sæbø in Linguist Philos 32(4):327–352, 2009; Pearson in J Semant 30(1):103–154, 2013a), this reading is not the only one: embedded SPs may also talk about someone else’s, non-local, judgment. We concentrate specifically on such cases and show that non-local judgment is possible if and only if SPs are used within a DP that is outside main predicate position and that entire DP is read de re. We demonstrate that the behavior of SPs in attitude reports does not differ from that of ordinary predicates: it follows from general constraints on intersective modification and intensional quantification (Farkas in Szabolcsi (ed) Ways of scope taking, Springer, Dordrecht, pp 183–215, 1997; Musan in On the temporal interpretation of noun phrases, Garland, New York, 1997; Percus in Nat Lang Semant 8(3):173–229, 2000; Keshet in Good intensions: paving two roads to a theory of the de re/de dicto distinction, Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, 2008). We argue that this unexceptional behavior of SPs in fact has unexpected consequences for SP exceptionalism. Precisely because SPs have been argued to be semantically different from ordinary predicates, not all theories correctly predict these less-studied data: some overgenerate (e.g. Stephenson 2007a, b; Stojanovic in Linguist Philos 30(6):691–706, 2007; Sæbø 2009) and some undergenerate (e.g. McCready in McNally, and Puig-Waldmüller (ed) Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung, vol 11, pp 433–447, 2007; Pearson 2013a). Out of the currently available theories, only relativist accounts (Lasersohn in Linguist Philos 28(6):643–686, 2005; MacFarlane 2014; Bylinina in J Semant 34(2), 291–331, 2017; Coppock in Linguist Philos 41(2):125–164, 2018) predict the right interpretation, and only that interpretation. We thus present a novel empirical argument for relativism, and, more generally, formulate a constraint that has to be taken into consideration by any view that advocates SP exceptionalism.

主观语言在形式语义学和语言哲学的近期文献中引起了大量关注（参见 MacFarlane 中的概述评估敏感性：相对真理及其应用，牛津大学出版社，牛津，2014 年；van Wijnbergen-Huitink，在 Meier 和 van Wijnbergen-Huitink (eds) 主观意义：相对主义的替代品，De Gruyter，柏林，第 1-19 页，2016 年；Lasersohn 的主观性和真理论语义的观点，牛津大学出版社，牛津，2017 年；Vardomskaya 的主观性来源，博士论文，芝加哥大学，伊利诺伊州，2018 年；Zakkou 在无错分歧中：在个人品味领域捍卫语境主义，Vittorio Klostermann，法兰克福，2019b）。大多数当前的理论认为主观谓词表达观点的 (SP) 在语义上不同于表达事实的普通谓词。我们将这种观点称为“SP 例外论”。本文通过审查态度报告中 SP 的行为来解决 SP 例外论，正如我们将要争论的那样，这显着限制了分析选项的空间并排除了一些现有理论。正如史蒂芬森 (Linguist Philos 30(4):487–525, 2007a; Towards a theory of principal meaning, 博士论文，麻省理工学院，剑桥，马萨诸塞州，2007b)，最突出的嵌入式阅读SP是他们谈论态度持有者主观判断的地方。正如有时所说的（Sæbø in Linguist Philos 32(4):327–352, 2009; Pearson in J Semant 30(1):103–154, 2013a），这种阅读并不是唯一的：嵌入式 SP 也可能会谈论其他人的、非本地的判断。我们特别关注这种情况，并表明当且仅当在主谓词位置之外的 DP 中使用 SP 并且读取整个 DP 时，非局部判断是可能的德雷. 我们证明了态度报告中 SP 的行为与普通谓词的行为没有区别：它遵循对交叉修改和内涵量化的一般约束（Farkas in Szabolcsi (ed) Ways of scope take, Springer, Dordrecht, pp 183–215 , 1997; Musan in On the temporal interprets, Garland, New York, 1997; Percus in Nat Lang Semant 8(3):173–229, 2000; Keshet in Good intensions: paving two road to a theory of the de re/de dicto 区别，博士论文，麻省理工学院，剑桥，马萨诸塞州，2008 年）。我们认为，SP 的这种非异常行为实际上对 SP 例外论产生了意想不到的后果。正是因为 SPs 被认为在语义上与普通谓词不同，并非所有理论都能正确预测这些研究较少的数据：一些过度生成（例如 Stephenson 2007a, b；Stojanovic in Linguist Philos 30(6):691–706, 2007；Sæbø 2009）和一些生成不足（例如 McNally 的 McCready，和 Puig-Waldmüller (ed) Proceedings of Sinungd 11，第 433–447 页，2007 年；Pearson 2013a)。在目前可用的理论中，只有相对主义的解释（Lasersohn in Linguist Philos 28(6):643–686, 2005; MacFarlane 2014; Bylinina in J Semant 34(2), 291–331, 2017; Coppock in 4 Linguist Philos 2):125–164, 2018) 预测正确的解释，而且只有那个解释。因此，我们为相对主义提出了一个新的经验论据，并且更一般地说，制定了一个必须被任何提倡 SP 例外论的观点考虑在内的约束。Sæbø 2009）和一些不成熟的人（例如 McNally 的 McCready，和 Puig-Waldmüller (ed) Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung，第 11 卷，第 433-447 页，2007 年；Pearson 2013a）。在目前可用的理论中，只有相对主义的解释（Lasersohn in Linguist Philos 28(6):643–686, 2005; MacFarlane 2014; Bylinina in J Semant 34(2), 291–331, 2017; Coppock in 4 Linguist Philos 2):125–164, 2018) 预测正确的解释，而且只有那个解释。因此，我们为相对主义提出了一个新的经验论点，并且更一般地说，制定了一个必须被任何提倡 SP 例外论的观点考虑在内的约束。Sæbø 2009）和一些不成熟的人（例如 McNally 的 McCready，和 Puig-Waldmüller (ed) Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung，第 11 卷，第 433-447 页，2007 年；Pearson 2013a）。在目前可用的理论中，只有相对主义的解释（Lasersohn in Linguist Philos 28(6):643–686, 2005; MacFarlane 2014; Bylinina in J Semant 34(2), 291–331, 2017; Coppock in 4 Linguist Philos 2):125–164, 2018) 预测正确的解释，而且只有那个解释。因此，我们为相对主义提出了一个新的经验论据，并且更一般地说，制定了一个必须被任何提倡 SP 例外论的观点考虑在内的约束。只有相对主义的解释（Lasersohn in Linguist Philos 28(6):643-686, 2005; MacFarlane 2014; Bylinina in J Semant 34(2), 291-331, 2017; Coppock in Linguist Philos 41(2), 2017: 2018）预测正确的解释，而且只有那个解释。因此，我们为相对主义提出了一个新的经验论据，并且更一般地说，制定了一个必须被任何提倡 SP 例外论的观点考虑在内的约束。只有相对主义的解释（Lasersohn in Linguist Philos 28(6):643-686, 2005; MacFarlane 2014; Bylinina in J Semant 34(2), 291-331, 2017; Coppock in Linguist Philos 41(2), 2017: 2018）预测正确的解释，而且只有那个解释。因此，我们为相对主义提出了一个新的经验论据，并且更一般地说，制定了一个必须被任何提倡 SP 例外论的观点考虑在内的约束。