By unfolding the simultaneous presence of the safeguarding function (i.e., contract monitoring) and coordinating function (i.e., joint action) of contracts, the current research operationalizes the dual-function of contracts and ascertains their effects on stimulating interfirm relationships. Analyzing the data collected from 512 manufacturers, we find that, first, contract specificity is positively associated with contract monitoring and joint action. Second, contract monitoring mediates the negative relationship between contract specificity and distributors' opportunistic behavior, while joint action mediates the positive relationship between contract specificity and channel cooperative performance. Third, while joint action directly improves channel performance, contract monitoring does not directly influence channel performance; rather, it promotes channel performance through inhibiting distributors' opportunism. In addition, contract monitoring and joint action substitute for each other in their influence on distributors' opportunism. Overall, we enrich and add insights into the literature on contractual governance by operationalizing the dual-function of contracts and investigating the underlying mechanisms of the dual-function in their influence over different channel outcomes

通过展开合同的保护功能（即合同监控）和协调功能（即联合行动）的同时存在，当前的研究将合同的双重功能操作化，并确定它们对刺激企业间关系的影响。分析从 512 家制造商收集的数据，我们发现，首先，合同特异性与合同监督和联合行动呈正相关。其次，合同监督在合同专一性与经销商机会主义行为之间的负相关关系中起中介作用，而联合行动在合同专一性与渠道合作绩效之间的正相关关系中起中介作用。第三，虽然联合行动直接提高了渠道绩效，但合同监控并不直接影响渠道绩效；相当，它通过抑制分销商的机会主义来提升渠道绩效。此外，合同监督和联合行动对经销商机会主义的影响相互替代。总体而言，我们通过实施合同的双重功能并研究双重功能对不同渠道结果的影响的潜在机制，丰富并增加了对合同治理文献的见解