In 2011, Italy introduced a ban on interlocking directorates in the financial sector, prohibiting members of the boards of directors and of the internal control bodies, as well as top managers of banking, insurance, and financial companies, from holding any such office in a competing company or group. Empirical studies have demonstrated conflicting results concerning the effectiveness of the Italian anti-interlocking provision. Some studies claim that interlocking directorates have decreased but have not been completely eliminated, which suggests possible persisting limits to competition. Other studies instead show the ban to have a procompetitive effect, at least in the banking sector, which would be at odds with a slight reduction in personal ties. Our article addresses this inconsistency by mapping the interlocking directorates among the 25 largest banking groups and the 25 largest insurance groups operating in Italy before and after the introduction of the ban. We show that although interlocking directorates were widespread at the end of 2010, the interlocking ban reached its goal in the banking and insurance sectors. Anticompetitive effects may, however, still exist, especially considering that the anti-interlocking provision does not affect ownership connections among competing financial companies and groups.

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评估意大利联锁禁令的有效性：意大利最大银行和保险集团之间个人关系的实证分析

2011 年，意大利颁布了一项禁止金融部门联锁董事会的禁令，禁止董事会和内部控制机构的成员以及银行、保险和金融公司的高级管理人员担任任何此类职位。竞争的公司或集团。实证研究表明，关于意大利反连锁规定的有效性，结果相互矛盾。一些研究声称联锁董事有所减少但尚未完全消除，这表明竞争可能持续存在限制。相反，其他研究表明，禁令具有促进竞争的作用，至少在银行业是这样，这与个人关系的轻微减少相矛盾。我们的文章通过绘制禁令前后在意大利经营的 25 家最大的银行集团和 25 家最大的保险集团之间的联锁董事会来解决这种不一致问题。我们表明，尽管联锁董事会在 2010 年底很普遍，但联锁禁令在银行和保险部门达到了目标。然而，反竞争效应可能仍然存在，特别是考虑到反连锁条款不会影响竞争金融公司和集团之间的所有权联系。