Private damage claims against cartels may have negative effects on leniency: whereas whistleblowers obtain full immunity regarding the public cartel fines, they have no or only restricted protection against private third-party damage claims. This may stabilize cartels. We run an experiment to study this issue. Firms choose whether to join a cartel, may apply for leniency afterward, and then potentially face private damages. We find that the implementation of private damage claims reduces cartel formation but makes cartels indeed more stable. The negative effect of damages is avoided in a novel setting where the whistleblower is also protected from damages (JEL C90, L41, L44).

中文翻译：

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私人损害索赔对卡特尔活动的影响：实验证据

针对卡特尔的私人损害索赔可能会对宽大处理产生负面影响：虽然举报人在公共卡特尔罚款方面获得完全豁免权，但他们对私人第三方损害索赔没有或只有有限的保护。这可能会稳定卡特尔。我们进行了一个实验来研究这个问题。公司选择是否加入卡特尔，之后可能会申请宽大处理，然后可能面临私人损失。我们发现私人损害索赔的实施减少了卡特尔的形成，但确实使卡特尔更加稳定。在保护举报人免受损害（JEL C90、L41、L44）的新颖环境中避免了损害的负面影响。