Regulators and other governors rely on intermediaries to set and implement policies and to regulate targets. Existing literatures focus heavily on intermediaries of a single type – Opportunists, motivated solely by self-interest. But intermediaries can also be motivated by different types of loyalty: to leaders (Vassals), to policies (Zealots), or to institutions (Mandarins). While all three types of loyalists are resistant to the traditional problems of opportunism (slacking and capture), each brings pathologies of its own. We explain the behavioral logic of each type of loyalty and analyze the risks and rewards of different intermediary loyalties – both for governors and for the public interest. We illustrate our claims with examples drawn from many different realms of regulation and governance.

中文翻译：

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超越机会主义：监管和治理中的中介忠诚度

监管者和其他监管者依靠中介机构来制定和实施政策并规范目标。现有文献主要关注单一类型的中介——机会主义者，完全出于自身利益。但是中间人也可能受到不同类型的忠诚的激励：对领导者 ( Vassals )、对政策 ( Zealots ) 或对机构 ( Mandarins)）。虽然所有三种类型的忠诚者都抵制机会主义的传统问题（懈怠和俘虏），但每种都带来了自己的病态。我们解释了每种忠诚度的行为逻辑，并分析了不同中介忠诚度的风险和回报——无论是为了州长还是为了公共利益。我们用来自许多不同监管和治理领域的例子来说明我们的主张。