This essay presents an argument, which it calls the Bias Argument, with the dismaying conclusion that (almost) everyone should significantly reduce her confidence in (too many) philosophical beliefs. More precisely, the argument attempts to show that the most precious philosophical beliefs are biased, as the pervasive and permanent disagreement among the leading experts in philosophy cannot be explained by the differences between their evidence bases and competences. After a short introduction, the premises of the Bias Argument are spelled out in the first part. The second part explains why the objections to the Bias Argument are not compelling. Even though the essay does not adopt the conclusion of the Bias Argument, partly because it seems to be self-defeating, the authors know no plausible way to refute its premises. Thus, the primary aim of the essay is to clarify why the aporetic situation of the Bias Argument arises.

中文翻译：

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鉴于同行分歧，哲学信仰的偏见性质

这篇文章提出了一个论点，它被称为偏见论点，其令人沮丧的结论是（几乎）每个人都应该大大降低她对（太多）哲学信仰的信心。更准确地说，该论点试图表明最宝贵的哲学信仰是有偏见的，因为哲学领域的主要专家之间普遍存在且永久的分歧不能用他们的证据基础和能力之间的差异来解释。在简短介绍之后，第一部分阐明了偏见论证的前提。第二部分解释了为什么对偏见论证的反对意见不具有说服力。尽管这篇文章没有采用偏见论证的结论，部分原因是它似乎是自欺欺人，但作者不知道反驳其前提的合理方法。因此，出现偏倚论证的孔隙情况。