One of the most important “folk” anti-realist thoughts about certain areas of our thought and discourse—basic taste, for instance, or comedy—is that their lack of objectivity crystallises in the possibility of “faultless disagreements”: situations where one party accepts P, another rejects P, and neither is guilty of any kind of mistake of substance or shortcoming of cognitive process. On close inspection, however, it proves challenging to make coherent sense of this idea, and a majority of theorists have come to reject it as incoherent. There are two significant exceptions in the contemporary literature: relativists often hold it up as something of a coup for their view that it can make straightforward sense of faultless disagreement; and the author of this paper has argued (Wright 2006) that making judicious intuitionistic revisions to classical logic can provide resources that suffice to stabilise the notion. The present paper argues that neither relativism nor intuitionism in fact provides a satisfactory account and indicates how an alethic pluralist framework enables us to do better.

中文翻译：

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道德多元主义、通货紧缩主义和完美的分歧

关于我们的思想和话语的某些领域（例如，基本品味或喜剧），最重要的“民间”反现实主义思想之一是，它们缺乏客观性体现在“无懈可击的分歧”的可能性中：一方接受P，另一个拒绝P，两者都没有犯任何实质错误或认知过程的缺陷。然而，仔细检查后，证明这个想法的连贯意义具有挑战性，并且大多数理论家已经开始拒绝它，因为它不连贯。当代文学中有两个重要的例外：相对主义者经常将其视为一种妙招，因为他们认为它可以直接理解无懈可击的分歧；并且本文的作者认为（Wright 2006）对经典逻辑进行明智的直觉修正可以提供足以稳定概念的资源。本论文认为，相对主义和直觉主义实际上都没有提供令人满意的解释，并表明一个道德多元主义的框架如何使我们做得更好。