A spate of social scientific literature gives the impression that societies in the twenty-first century are overrun with ‘neoliberal subjects’. But what does it actually mean to be a neoliberal subject? And in what ways does this concept relate to ‘neoliberalism’, more generally? In this article, I distinguish between four common ways of thinking about ‘neoliberalism’: (1) as a set of economic policies, (2) as a hegemonic ideological project, (3) as a political rationality and form of governmentality and (4) as a specific type of embodied subjectivity. I argue that while neoliberalisms (1), (2) and (3) potentially hold clear conceptual connections to one another – notwithstanding the quite real tensions between them – their relationship to neoliberalism (4) is often (although not always) tenuous at best. That is, the evidence routinely offered to demonstrate the existence of neoliberalism (4) bears almost no necessary relationship to neoliberalisms (1), (2) or (3). I conclude that, for both academic and political reasons, scholars should be more careful when invoking the monolithic notion of a ‘neoliberal subject’.

大量社会科学文献给人的印象是，21 世纪的社会充斥着“新自由主义主体”。但成为新自由主义主体究竟意味着什么？这个概念在哪些方面与“新自由主义”相关，更普遍的是？在本文中，我区分了关于“新自由主义”的四种常见思考方式：(1) 作为一套经济政策，(2) 作为一种霸权的意识形态项目，(3) 作为一种政治理性和治理形式，以及 (4) ) 作为具体类型的具身主观性。我认为，虽然新自由主义 (1)、(2) 和 (3) 之间可能存在明确的概念联系——尽管它们之间存在着相当真实的紧张关系——但它们与新自由主义 (4) 的关系通常（尽管并非总是）充其量是脆弱的. 那是，通常提供的证明新自由主义存在的证据 (4) 与新自由主义 (1)、(2) 或 (3) 几乎没有必然关系。我的结论是，出于学术和政治原因，学者在援引“新自由主义主体”的整体概念时应该更加谨慎。