ABSTRACT

Recommender systems enable firms to target customers with products and services that better match their needs, as well as cross-sell products and services. Considering these factors in markets with monopoly and duopoly, we investigate (i) How do pricing strategies differ when firms cross-sell versus when they do not cross-sell, and (ii) How do these pricing strategies change when a firm improves its recommender system? We find that cross-selling can enable a monopolist to subsidize its price for the focal products, while maximizing its profit. In a duopoly, the price set by the firm with the inferior system (low-type firm) is always lower when the firms cross-sell than when the firms do not cross-sell; however, that does not necessarily hold for the high-type firm. When the high-type firm improves its recommender system, the low-type firm may decrease its price when firms cross-sell, which does not happen when firms do not cross-sell.

摘要

推荐系统使公司能够以更符合客户需求的产品和服务为目标，并交叉销售产品和服务。考虑到垄断和双头垄断市场中的这些因素，我们调查 (i) 公司交叉销售与不交叉销售时的定价策略有何不同，以及 (ii) 当公司改进其推荐者时，这些定价策略如何变化系统？我们发现交叉销售可以使垄断者补贴其焦点产品的价格，同时最大化其利润。在双头垄断中，当企业交叉销售时，具有劣等系统的企业（低型企业）设定的价格总是低于企业不交叉销售时的价格；然而，这并不一定适用于高类型公司。当高类型公司改进其推荐系统时，