In this paper, we reconcile divergent theories linking trade to conflict—opportunity costs and costly signaling on the one hand versus dependence and coercion on the other hand. We argue that variation in domestic political institutions and state capabilities can condition how international trade affects conflictual or cooperative political relationships. When institutions result in a more nationally representative constituency, trade has a relatively more negative association with conflict, whereas deviation from this institutional arrangement reduces the pacifying impact of trade. The presence of greater military capabilities incentivizes leaders to use trade as a lever to advance other state interests. As such, for more powerful states, trade is associated with relatively more conflict and cooperation. We find support for our expectations in statistical tests spanning 1994–2012.

中文翻译：

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国际贸易、合作与冲突：制度与能力的作用

在本文中，我们调和了将贸易与冲突联系起来的不同理论——一方面是机会成本和代价高昂的信号，另一方面是依赖和胁迫。我们认为，国内政治制度和国家能力的变化可以决定国际贸易如何影响冲突或合作的政治关系。当制度产生更具全国代表性的选民时，贸易与冲突的负面关联相对更大，而偏离这种制度安排会降低贸易的安抚影响。更强大的军事能力的存在激励领导人利用贸易作为推进其他国家利益的杠杆。因此，对于更强大的国家来说，贸易与相对更多的冲突与合作相关联。