A central issue that is discussed in climate policy is the fear of owners of stocks of fossil hydrocarbon deposits that high CO₂ taxes and bans on the combustion use of hydrocarbons will turn their stocks into stranded assets. They might react by extracting and selling their reserves today: a rush to burn results. We show how the stranded-asset problem could be avoided or strongly moderated. We analyze a simple intertemporal equilibrium with a given stock of fossil hydrocarbons. The key variable for a climate-neutral solution to the rush-to-burn problem is to maintain existing and generate new markets for climate-neutral products from fossil hydrocarbons in the future. We give examples of such products. In this framework subsidies for such products (or for their innovation) also reduce the rush-to-burn problem. In contrast, the creation of substitutes for fossil hydrocarbon-based climate-neutral products, or subsidies for such products reduce the market for products made from fossil hydrocarbons. This aggravates the stranded-assets problem and thus has a climate-damaging effect.

气候政策中讨论的一个核心问题是，拥有高 CO ₂对碳氢化合物燃烧使用的税收和禁令将使他们的库存变成搁浅资产。他们今天可能会通过开采和出售他们的储备做出反应：急于燃烧结果。我们展示了如何避免或强烈缓解搁浅资产问题。我们用给定的化石碳氢化合物存量分析了一个简单的跨期平衡。解决急于燃烧问题的气候中和解决方案的关键变量是在未来维持现有的气候中和产品并为化石碳氢化合物的气候中和产品创造新的市场。我们给出了此类产品的示例。在这个框架中，对此类产品（或其创新）的补贴也减少了急于燃烧的问题。相比之下，为化石碳氢化合物创造气候中性产品的替代品，或对此类产品的补贴减少了由化石碳氢化合物制成的产品的市场。这加剧了搁浅资产问题，从而具有破坏气候的影响。