Physical attacks, namely invasive, observation, and combined, represent a great challenge for today's digital design. Successful class of strategies adopted by industry, allowing hiding data dependency of the side channel emissions in CMOS is based on balancing. Although attacks on CMOS dynamic power represent a class of state-of-the-art attacks, vulnerabilities exploiting data dependency in CMOS static power and light-modulated static power were recently presented. In this paper, we describe structures and techniques developed to enhance and balance the power imprint of the traditional static CMOS bulk structures under invasive light attack.

The novel standard cells designed according to the presented techniques in the TSMC180nm technology node were used to synthesize the dual-rail AES SBOX block. The behavior of the AES SBOX block composed of the novel cells is compared to classical approaches. Usage of novel cells enhances circuit security under invasive light attack while preserving comparable circuit resistance against state-of-the-art power attacks.

物理攻击，即侵入式、观察式和组合式，对当今的数字设计提出了巨大的挑战。业界采用的成功策略类，允许隐藏 CMOS 中侧通道发射的数据依赖性是基于平衡的。尽管对 CMOS 动态功率的攻击代表了一类最先进的攻击，但最近提出了利用 CMOS 静态功率和光调制静态功率中的数据依赖性的漏洞。在本文中，我们描述了为增强和平衡传统静态 CMOS 体结构在侵入光攻击下的功率印记而开发的结构和技术。

根据 TSMC180nm 技术节点中提出的技术设计的新型标准单元用于合成双轨 AES SBOX 模块。将由新单元组成的 AES SBOX 块的行为与经典方法进行比较。新型电池的使用增强了侵入式光攻击下的电路安全性，同时保持了对最先进电源攻击的可比电路抵抗力。