Some moral propositions are so obviously true that we refuse to doubt them, even where we believe that many people disagree. Following Fritz and McPherson, I call our behaviour in such cases ‘moral steadfastness’. In this paper, I argue for two metaethical implications of moral steadfastness. I first argue that morally steadfast behaviour is sufficiently prevalent to present an important challenge for some prominent analogies between moral epistemology and non-moral forms of epistemology. These analogies are often pressed by moral realists. I then argue that moral quasi-realism, unlike realism, can explain and vindicate our presumption that moral steadfastness is frequently rational. On the assumption that we frequently act as it is rational to act, quasi-realism is therefore well placed to explain why we are so frequently morally steadfast. I conclude that this is an important respect in which quasi-realism is explanatorily preferable to realism.

中文翻译：

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道德现实主义、准现实主义与道德坚定

一些道德命题显然是正确的，以至于我们拒绝怀疑它们，即使我们认为许多人不同意。继弗里茨和麦克弗森之后，我将我们在这种情况下的行为称为“道德坚定”。在本文中，我论证了道德坚定性的两个元伦理学含义。我首先认为，道德上坚定的行为足够普遍，以至于对道德认识论和非道德形式的认识论之间的一些突出类比提出了重要挑战。道德现实主义者经常强调这些类比。然后，我认为，与现实主义不同，道德准现实主义可以解释和证明我们的假设，即道德坚定经常是理性的。假设我们经常以理性的方式行事，因此准现实主义可以很好地解释为什么我们在道德上如此频繁地坚定不移。