Mechanism design is a form of optimization developed in economic theory. It casts economists as institutional engineers, choosing an outcome and then arranging a set of market rules and conditions to achieve it. The toolkit from mechanism design is widely used in economics, policymaking, and now in building and managing online environments. Mechanism design has become one of the most pervasive yet inconspicuous influences on the digital mediation of social life. Its optimizing schemes structure online advertising markets and other multi-sided platform businesses. Whatever normative rationales mechanism design might draw on in its economic origins, as its influence has grown and its applications have become more computational, we suggest those justifications for using mechanism design to orchestrate and optimize human interaction are losing traction. In this article, we ask what ideological work mechanism design is doing in economics, computer science, and its applications to the governance of digital platforms. Observing mechanism design in action in algorithmic environments, we argue it has become a tool for producing information domination, distributing social costs in ways that benefit designers, and controlling and coordinating participants in multi-sided platforms.

机构设计是经济理论中发展起来的一种优化形式。它将经济学家塑造为制度工程师，选择一个结果，然后安排一套市场规则和条件来实现它。机制设计的工具包广泛用于经济学、政策制定，现在用于构建和管理在线环境。机制设计已成为对社会生活的数字中介最普遍但最不起眼的影响之一。其优化方案构建了在线广告市场和其他多边平台业务。无论机制设计在其经济起源中可能借鉴什么规范原理，随着其影响力的增长及其应用变得更加计算化，我们认为，那些使用机制设计来协调和优化人机交互的理由正在失去吸引力。在本文中，我们询问意识形态工作机制设计在经济学、计算机科学及其在数字平台治理中的应用。观察算法环境中的机制设计，我们认为它已成为产生信息支配、以有利于设计者的方式分配社会成本以及控制和协调多边平台参与者的工具。