Firms sharing a board member with a media company receive more news coverage. This in turn affects those firms’ financing choices: they issue more bonds, rely less on bank loans, and have lower blockholder ownership. These findings are consistent with media coverage acting as an external governance mechanism that substitutes for monitoring by banks and equity blockholders. The effect of media-linked directors on financing is evident in panel and time series analyses and using two different instrumental variable analyses, suggesting a causal relation.

中文翻译：

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媒体关联董事对融资和外部治理的影响

与媒体公司共享董事会成员的公司会获得更多的新闻报道。这反过来会影响这些公司的融资选择：他们发行更多债券，更少依赖银行贷款，并且拥有更少的大股东所有权。这些发现与作为外部治理机制替代银行和股权大股东监控的媒体报道一致。与媒体相关的董事对融资的影响在面板和时间序列分析中以及使用两种不同的工具变量分析中很明显，表明存在因果关系。