In “The Provenance and Protection of Legitimate Expectations” Forsyth argued that English law should protect substantive legitimate expectations. However, he was concerned that too great an expansion of legitimate expectations could lead to incoherence and intuitive decision-making. I argue that recent case law, and Forsyth's analysis, have clarified some of these inconsistencies. Nevertheless, the doctrine of legitimate expectations stands at a crossroads. Should it adopt a rules-based approach and narrow legitimate expectations, or a principled approach that embraces a broader conception? I argue that English law needs both for legitimate expectations effectively to balance legal certainty and substantive equality.

中文翻译：

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卡在十字路口？英国法律中的实质性合法期望

在“合法期望的来源和保护”中，福赛思认为英国法律应该保护实质性合法期望。然而，他担心合理预期的过度扩张会导致决策的不一致和直觉。我认为最近的判例法和福赛斯的分析已经澄清了其中一些不一致之处。然而，合法期望的学说站在一个十字路口。它应该采用基于规则的方法和狭隘的合法期望，还是采用包含更广泛概念的原则性方法？我认为，英国法既需要合法的期望，又需要有效地平衡法律确定性和实质性平等。