This paper considers product recall under a perfect regime of strict liability. We show that safety is under supplied given output due to an under internalization of infra-marginal units. If we add a mandatory refund with a possible penalty fee in the event that the product turns out to be unsafe, then while the price increases, there is no change in the allocation, utility, profit or total welfare. The recall procedure is then neutral. We then extend the model to examine optimal fines and minimum output taxes, endogenous proclivity to return a product, endogenous decision to sue in the event of damage and the effects of having the consumer under estimate expected damages.

本文考虑了完善的严格责任制度下的产品召回。我们表明，由于边际下单位内部化不足，给定产出的安全性不足。如果我们在产品不安全的情况下增加强制退款并可能收取罚款，那么虽然价格上涨，但分配、效用、利润或总福利不会发生变化。召回程序是中立的。然后，我们扩展该模型来检查最佳罚款和最低销项税、退回产品的内生倾向、发生损坏时提起诉讼的内生决定以及消费者低估预期损失的影响。