ABSTRACT

This article considers the way the interpretation of the ‘ambit’ of the right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 ECHR has developed in the English courts over time and explores Lady Hale’s influence on this development. English courts started by taking an unduly narrow interpretation of ‘ambit’. The majority in Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v M even sought to make a connection between the intensity of the infringement of the right and its ‘ambit’. Lady Hale dissented and correctly identified ‘ambit’ and justification as separate issues, and that the intensity of a potential infringement only is a question for the latter. In Re McLaughlin she later stated that the English courts wrongly had relied on domestically developed concepts rather than the Strasbourg jurisprudence, thus setting the courts on the right path. The article concludes that nevertheless the final steps to arriving at the correct interpretation still need to be taken: the express recognition that the intensity of the infringement cannot define the ‘ambit’ of the right concerned, but rather is a question that needs to be considered separately when determining whether the infringement can be justified.

摘要

本文考虑了英国法院对《欧洲人权公约》第 8 条下尊重私人和家庭生活的权利的“范围”的解释随着时间的推移在英国法院的发展方式，并探讨了黑尔夫人对这一发展的影响。英国法院开始对“范围”采取过分狭隘的解释。工作和养老金大臣诉 M 案中的大多数人  甚至试图将侵犯权利的强度与其“范围”联系起来。黑尔夫人反对并正确地将“范围”和理由确定为单独的问题，并且潜在侵权的强度只是后者的问题。在 Re McLaughlin 她后来表示，英国法院错误地依赖了国内发展的概念，而不是斯特拉斯堡的判例，从而使法院走上了正确的道路。文章的结论是，仍然需要采取最终步骤来达成正确的解释：明确承认侵权的强度不能定义相关权利的“范围”，而是一个需要考虑的问题在判断侵权行为是否正当时另行规定。