Standard accounts of analogy in law picture it as reasoning from the past case (source) to a solution in the case at hand (target). This article argues that the normatively constraining invocations of similarity or likeness presupposed by standard accounts do not obtain. It then sketches an alternative account based on Michael Polanyi's idea of polycentricity (not Lon Fuller's) on which the orientation of analogical reasoning is reversed. A past case (here “target”) is picked and framed in certain ways to persuade the interlocutor about the decision independently reached in the present case (here “source”) through the guidance of tacit knowledge (involving anticipation of what is likely to pass muster with the legal community) which normatively constrains the process.

中文翻译：

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类比反转

法律类比的标准描述将其描绘为推理从过去的案例（来源）到手头的案例（目标）的解决方案。本文认为，标准账户预设的对相似性或相似性的规范约束调用并不成立。然后，它基于迈克尔·波兰尼的多中心思想（不是朗·富勒的）勾勒出另一种解释，其中类比推理的方向是反转. 过去的案例（这里是“目标”）被挑选出来并以某种方式框起来，以说服对话者在本案（此处为“来源”）的指导下独立达成的决定隐性知识（涉及对可能通过法律界认可的内容的预期）规范地限制了该过程。