I compare the efficiency of different equilibria reached in a credit rating game that allows for communication between the issuer and two credit rating agencies (CRAs) prior to disclosing ratings. CRAs observe private signals that correlate with asset quality and can learn about each other’s signals by exchanging messages with the issuer. Conflicts of interest lead CRAs to provide biased ratings. When issuer messages are informative about signals, CRAs find it optimal to selectively offer biased ratings based on issuer messages. Messages are informative when the issuer discloses high ratings from both CRAs and profits more from increasing issuance than from selling its worst assets. The equilibrium in which only one CRA provides ratings leads to the highest efficiency when average asset quality is low, agency signals frequently disagree and asset payoffs are skewed.

我比较了信用评级游戏中达到的不同均衡的效率，该游戏允许发行人在披露评级之前与两个信用评级机构 (CRA) 进行沟通。CRA 观察与资产质量相关的私人信号，并可以通过与发行人交换消息来了解彼此的信号。利益冲突导致信用评级机构提供有偏见的评级。当发行人消息提供有关信号的信息时，信用评级机构发现根据发行人消息有选择地提供有偏见的评级是最佳选择。当发行人披露信用评级机构的高评级以及通过增加发行而不是出售其最糟糕的资产获得更多利润时，消息是有益的。当平均资产质量较低时，只有一个 CRA 提供评级的均衡导致最高效率，