I examine how the appearance of managerial overconfidence and managerial ability affect 1) auditors' decisions to issue a going concern opinion and 2) auditor dismissal rates after issuing a going concern opinion. Managerial attributes are likely to have an influence on auditors' decisions because auditors obtain and evaluate information about client management's remedy plans when there is substantial doubt about the entity's ability to continue as a going concern. While prior literature on managerial overconfidence classifies all managers who demonstrate overconfident behaviors in one group, I argue that the literature needs to take managerial ability into consideration when measuring overconfidence. I find that auditors are more likely to issue a going concern opinion to clients with seemingly overconfident managers only when the management who appears overconfident is also incompetent. I also find that auditors are more likely to be dismissed after issuance of a going concern opinion when the client company has seemingly overconfident management. Finally, I find that the association between managerial overconfidence and auditor dismissal subsequent to issuance of a going concern opinion is stronger when management is relatively more powerful than the company's audit committee.

我研究了管理过度自信和管理能力的出现如何影响 1) 审计师发表持续经营意见的决定和 2) 发表持续经营意见后的审计师解雇率。管理属性很可能会影响审计师的决策，因为当对实体的持续经营能力存在重大怀疑时，审计师会获取和评估有关客户管理层补救计划的信息。虽然先前关于管理过度自信的文献将所有表现出过度自信行为的管理者归为一组，但我认为，在衡量过度自信时，文献需要考虑管理能力。我发现，只有当看起来过于自信的管理层也无能时，审计师才更有可能向看似过度自信的经理的客户发布持续经营意见。我还发现，当客户公司似乎对管理层过于自信时，审计师更有可能在发布持续经营意见后被解雇。最后，我发现，当管理层比公司审计委员会的权力相对更大时，管理层过度自信与在发布持续经营意见后解雇审计师之间的关联更强。