Judicialization scholarship suggests that states must seek the de-judicialization of international dispute settlement mechanisms to regain regulatory space. Why then do some states seek a de-judicialization yet others increased judicialization of dispute settlement mechanisms in their pursuit of regulatory space? This article advances a twofold argument. First, the concept of judicialization has been erroneously conflated with state perceptions of regulatory space under dispute settlement mechanisms. States aspiring to consolidate regulatory space may pursue de-judicialization and increased judicialization alike. Second, states' preferences for de-judicialization or increased judicialization to regain regulatory space should largely depend on conceptions of legitimate international law as either intergovernmental contracts or cosmopolitan quasi-constitutional order. The article illustrates these arguments at the example of US and EU efforts to reform the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization and investor-to-state dispute settlement. Both seek to increase regulatory space. Yet, the USA pursues de-judicialization while the EU promotes judicialization.

中文翻译：

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为什么要非司法化？在世界贸易组织争端解决机构和投资者对国家争端解决改革中解释国家对司法化的偏好

司法化研究表明，各国必须寻求国际争端解决机制的非司法化，以重新获得监管空间。那么，为什么一些国家在寻求监管空间时寻求去司法化，而另一些国家则增加争端解决机制的司法化？本文提出了一个双重论点。首先，司法化的概念被错误地与争端解决机制下国家对监管空间的认知混为一谈。渴望巩固监管空间的国家可能会追求非司法化和增加司法化。二、国家 倾向于去司法化或增加司法化以重新获得监管空间，在很大程度上应取决于将合法国际法视为政府间合同或世界性准宪法秩序的概念。本文以美国和欧盟努力改革世界贸易组织争端解决机构和投资者与国家争端解决机制的努力为例，说明了这些论点。两者都寻求增加监管空间。然而，美国追求去司法化，而欧盟则提倡司法化。