Abstract

Twenty years ago, in December 2000, the SRU Law (Loi Solidarité et Renouvellement Urbain) was passed in France, requiring selected municipalities to devote 25% of their local stock to social housing, in order to curb growing trends of segregation. Almost twenty years later, the balance is striking: still 1,222 municipalities targeted by the program do not comply with the set quota of 25% social housing units per municipality. Out of these non-complying municipalities, 269 had to pay an increased fee in 2017, based on the Article 55 clause included in the SRU Law. The total fee that these ‘outlaw municipalities’ had to pay for not providing enough social housing represented a total of € 77 million in 2017, and helped finance the national rental social housing fund for housing. In this paper, I ask what impact the Article 55 fee clause designed to enforce SRU Law objectives has had on the rebalancing of social housing stocks for municipalities not complying with set quotas. To answer such a question, I conduct a Difference-in-Differences study that measures changes in social housing stocks before and after the passage of the law. The treatment group comprises municipalities not complying with quota requirements and subject to the Article 55 fee, while the control group consists of municipalities not complying with quota requirements, but exempt from the fee. Findings underscore how after the passage of the Article 55 fee, municipalities that were subject to the fee have built less social housing than municipalities that are exempt, relative to before the enactment of the law. They corroborate my conceptual framework, which states that beyond the adoption of a national fee for noncompliant municipalities, social housing production trends are impacted by the types of land use ideologies in place in municipalities, be they pro-social housing or exclusionary. Twenty years later, these findings bring a new perspective to current debates taking place in policy circles around the effectiveness of one of France’s most important social housing policy programs.

摘要

二十年前，即 2000 年 12 月，法国通过了 SRU 法（Loi Solidarité et Renouvellement Urbain），要求选定的城市将当地存量的 25% 用于社会住房，以遏制日益增长的种族隔离趋势。近二十年后，这种平衡是惊人的：该计划所针对的 1,222 个城市仍然没有遵守每个城市 25% 社会住房单位的设定配额。根据《SRU 法》第 55 条条款，在这些不遵守规定的城市中，2017 年有 269 个城市必须支付更高的费用。2017 年，这些“非法城市”因未提供足够社会住房而必须支付的费用总额为 7700 万欧元，并为国家住房租赁社会住房基金提供了资金。在本文中，我想问的是，旨在执行 SRU 法目标的第 55 条费用条款对不遵守既定配额的市政当局的社会住房存量重新平衡有何影响。为了回答这个问题，我进行了一项双重差分研究，衡量该法律通过前后社会住房存量的变化。处理组由不符合配额要求并需缴纳第 55 条费用的城市组成，而对照组由不符合配额要求但免缴该费用的城市组成。调查结果强调，在第 55 条费用通过后，与该法律颁布之前相比，缴纳该费用的城市建造的社会住房数量少于免缴费用的城市。它们证实了我的概念框架，其中指出，除了对不合规的城市征收国家费用外，社会住房生产趋势还受到城市现有土地使用意识形态类型的影响，无论是支持社会住房还是排斥性住房。二十年后，这些发现为当前政策界围绕法国最重要的社会住房政策计划之一的有效性进行的辩论带来了新的视角。