Representationalists and anti-representationalists disagree about whether a naturalisation of mental content is possible and, hence, whether positing mental representations in cognitive science is justified. Here, I develop a novel way to think about mental representations based on a philosophical description of (cognitive) science inspired by cognitive instrumentalism. On this view, our acceptance of theories positing mental representations and our beliefs in (something like) mental representations do not depend on the naturalisation of content. Thus, I conclude that if we endorse cognitive instrumentalism about mental representations, then we can finally leave the dispute between representationalism and anti-representationalism behind.

中文翻译：

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关于心理表征的认知工具主义

表征主义者和反表征主义者对于心理内容的自然化是否可能存在分歧，因此，在认知科学中设置心理表征是否合理。在这里，我基于受认知工具主义启发的（认知）科学的哲学描述，开发了一种思考心理表征的新方法。根据这种观点，我们对假设心理表征的理论的接受和我们对（类似的）心理表征的信念并不依赖于内容的自然化。因此，我得出结论，如果我们支持关于心理表征的认知工具主义，那么我们最终可以将表征主义与反表征主义之间的争论抛在脑后。