Firms and CEOs are linked in the factor market because CEO talents are transferable across different firms. Shareholder activism increases the nontarget firm's outside option and reduces the nontarget CEO's outside option. This leads to higher profit and lower CEO compensation at the nontarget firm. Due to this positive spillover, the activist's intervention is inefficiently low. As CEO talents become more transferable, monitoring, and performance improve more and CEO compensation decreases more at the nontarget firm; shareholder activism becomes less efficient due to the increased linkage between CEOs. This paper also provides a number of novel empirical predictions.

中文翻译：

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股东积极主义的要素市场溢出效应

公司和 CEO 在要素市场上是相互关联的，因为 CEO 的人才可以在不同的公司之间转移。股东积极主义增加了非目标公司的外部选择权，并减少了非目标公司 CEO 的外部选择权。这导致非目标公司更高的利润和更低的 CEO 薪酬。由于这种积极的溢出效应，积极分子的干预效率很低。随着 CEO 人才的可转移性越来越高，非目标公司的监督和绩效改善更多，而 CEO 薪酬下降更多；由于首席执行官之间的联系增加，股东积极主义变得效率低下。本文还提供了许多新颖的经验预测。