Our paper shows how Charles P. Kindleberger examined the function of the international lender of last resort and anticipated the rules governing the dollar swap line program (with unlimited amounts and at a fixed price) implemented by the Federal Reserve in the aftermath of the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. We systematically explore Kindleberger’s works on the central bank swap agreement in order to discern the theoretical foundations of the international lender of last resort rules he proposed. In this respect, two of his arguments that appear concomitantly must be distinguished. The first concerns the burden that the leadership partly or mostly should shoulder because of the problem of free riding—this is the traditional argument of benevolent leadership. The second argument concerns the efficiency with which the leadership operates as the stabilizer given the international monetary and financial context—this argument of the efficient stabilizer has been far less studied in the literature. We find that the Federal Reserve was not a benevolent monetary institution, but the global financial stabilizer instead—meaning that Kindleberger’s second argument finally prevailed. We conclude by emphasizing how central bankers rediscovered Kindleberger’s contribution to the international lender of last resort function.

中文翻译：

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回顾金德伯格：美联储的美元互换额度和国际最后贷款人规则

我们的论文展示了 Charles P. Kindleberger 如何检查国际最后贷款人的职能，并预测美联储在金融危机失败后实施的美元互换额度计划（无限量和固定价格）规则。雷曼兄弟，2008 年 9 月。我们系统地探讨了金德尔伯格关于中央银行互换协议的著作，以了解他提出的国际最后贷款人规则的理论基础。在这方面，必须区分他同时出现的两个论点。第一个是领导层由于搭便车问题而部分或大部分应该承担的负担——这是仁慈领导的传统论点。第二个论点涉及在国际货币和金融背景下领导层作为稳定器运作的效率——关于有效稳定器的这一论点在文献中的研究要少得多。我们发现美联储不是一个仁慈的货币机构，而是全球金融稳定器——这意味着金德尔伯格的第二个论点最终占了上风。最后，我们强调中央银行如何重新发现金德尔伯格对国际最后贷款人职能的贡献。而是全球金融稳定器——这意味着金德尔伯格的第二个论点最终占了上风。最后，我们强调中央银行如何重新发现金德尔伯格对国际最后贷款人职能的贡献。而是全球金融稳定器——这意味着金德尔伯格的第二个论点最终占了上风。最后，我们强调中央银行如何重新发现金德尔伯格对国际最后贷款人职能的贡献。