We study the economic consequences of mandates that require bank auditors to report to bank regulators. Based on survey responses from the European Central Bank, all 28 national bank regulators within the European Union, and a review of national banking regulations, we create a novel dataset on these mandates. Exploiting the cross-sectional and time-series variation in these mandates, we find evidence that auditor reporting to bank regulators reduces bank riskiness, as measured by counterparty risk and credit spreads. We also observe a decline in problem loans and risk-weighted assets, as well as improvements in timeliness of loan loss provisions. Additional analyses suggest that mandated auditor reporting increases the effectiveness of supervisory and monitoring efforts and improves market discipline of banks. However, mandated auditor reporting comes with costs: it reduces future lending growth, risky lending, and profitability, and increases audit fees paid by shareholders.

我们研究了要求银行审计师向银行监管机构报告的授权的经济后果。根据欧洲中央银行、欧盟所有 28 个国家银行监管机构的调查回复以及对国家银行监管的审查，我们创建了一个关于这些任务的新数据集。利用这些授权中的横截面和时间序列变化，我们发现证据表明，审计师向银行监管机构报告降低了银行风险，以交易对手风险和信用利差衡量。我们还观察到问题贷款和风险加权资产的下降，以及贷款损失准备的及时性有所改善。其他分析表明，强制审计报告提高了监管和监督工作的有效性，并改善了银行的市场纪律。然而，