ABSTRACT

The impact of a switch of management company on pension plan fees is analysed by comparing the effects on employer-sponsored versus individual defined-contribution private pension plans in Spain. This framework is ideal because the two types differ significantly both in plan governance structure and consequently in the degree of bargaining power held by the decision-maker. In addition, intense bank restructuring, which has greatly modified the Spanish pension plan map, provides an interesting analytical context for the identification of causal links, because it is a scenario that features shocks exogenous to the relationship under analysis. The results show that a switch of management company significantly reduces management fees for employer-sponsored plans when the management change is not due to the bank restructuring process, on the contrary a switch of management company increases fees for individual pension plans.

摘要

通过比较西班牙雇主赞助和个人固定缴款私人养老金计划的影响，分析了管理公司转换对养老金计划费用的影响。这个框架是理想的，因为这两种类型在计划治理结构和决策者所拥有的议价能力方面都存在显着差异。此外，极大地修改了西班牙养老金计划地图的银行重组为确定因果关系提供了一个有趣的分析背景，因为它是一种具有与所分析的关系外生的冲击的情景。结果表明，当管理层变更不是由于银行重组过程引起的时，管理公司的转换显着降低了雇主赞助计划的管理费用，