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Creating Regulatory Harmony: The Participatory Politics of OECD Chemical Testing Standards in the Making
Science, Technology, & Human Values ( IF 3.1 ) Pub Date : 2021-07-30 , DOI: 10.1177/01622439211029369
Colleen Lanier-Christensen 1
Affiliation  

In recent decades, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has become a powerful forum for trade liberalization and regulatory harmonization. OECD members have worked to reconcile divergent national regulatory approaches, applying a single framework across sovereign states, in effect determining whose knowledge-making practices would guide regulatory action throughout the industrialized world. Focusing on US regulators, industry associations, and environmental groups, this article explores the participatory politics of OECD chemical regulation harmonization in the late 1970s to early 1980s. These efforts were conditioned by differential institutional access and resources among stakeholders who sought to shape regulatory knowledge rules. Facing competing European and US approaches to chemical data—a minimum “base set” of test data versus case-by-case determinations—OECD members chose the European approach in 1980. However, US regulatory politics shifted with the election of President Reagan, prompting industry associations to lobby the US government to block the agreement. Examining the micropolitics of these standards in the making, I demonstrate that while long-term structures advantaged industrial actors, ideological alignment with the US government precipitated their decisive influence. The case illustrates the importance of attending to the distinctive politics of international harmonization and the effects on transnational knowledge-making and regulatory intervention.



中文翻译:

创造监管和谐:经济合作与发展组织化学测试标准制定过程中的参与政治

近几十年来,经济合作与发展组织 (OECD) 已成为贸易自由化和监管协调的强大论坛。经合组织成员致力于协调不同的国家监管方法,在主权国家之间应用单一框架,实际上确定了谁的知识创造实践将指导整个工业化世界的监管行动。本文重点关注美国监管机构、行业协会和环保团体,探讨了 1970 年代末至 1980 年代初经合组织化学品监管协调的参与政治。这些努力受制于试图塑造监管知识规则的利益相关者之间不同的机构准入和资源。面对竞争的欧洲和美国化学数据的方法 - 测试数据的最低“基础集”与逐个案例决定 - 经合组织的成员于1980年选择了欧洲方法。然而,美国监管政治随着主席重新开始而转移,提示行业协会游说美国政府阻止该协议。通过检查这些标准的微观政治,我证明虽然长期结构有利于工业参与者,但与美国政府的意识形态一致促成了它们的决定性影响。该案例说明了关注国际协调的独特政治以及对跨国知识创造和监管干预的影响的重要性。美国监管政治随着选举重新开始而转移,促使行业协会将美国政府大厅划分的达成协议。通过检查这些标准的微观政治,我证明虽然长期结构有利于工业参与者,但与美国政府的意识形态一致促成了它们的决定性影响。该案例说明了关注国际协调的独特政治以及对跨国知识创造和监管干预的影响的重要性。美国监管政治随着选举重新开始而转移,促使行业协会将美国政府大厅划分的达成协议。通过检查这些标准的微观政治,我证明虽然长期结构有利于工业参与者,但与美国政府的意识形态一致促成了它们的决定性影响。该案例说明了关注国际协调的独特政治以及对跨国知识创造和监管干预的影响的重要性。与美国政府的意识形态结盟促成了他们的决定性影响。该案例说明了关注国际协调的独特政治以及对跨国知识创造和监管干预的影响的重要性。与美国政府的意识形态结盟促成了他们的决定性影响。该案例说明了关注国际协调的独特政治以及对跨国知识创造和监管干预的影响的重要性。

更新日期:2021-07-30
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