ABSTRACT

A longstanding orthodoxy holds that the Mohists regard the promotion of li (benefit, 利) as their ultimate normative criterion, meaning that they measure what is yi (just, 義) or buyi (unjust, 不義) depending on whether it maximizes li or not. This orthodoxy dates back at least to Joseph Edkins (1859), who saw Mozi as a utilitarian and an ally of Bentham. In this paper, we will argue that this orthodoxy should be reconsidered because it does not square with several passages from the Mozi. That the Mohists place a strong weight on the promotion of ‘li for the whole world (tianxia zhi li, 天下之利)’ is uncontroversial. We argue, however, that in certain cases the Mohist moral calculus diverges in its rationale or outcome from li-promotionalism. This position rejects the orthodoxy by showing that Mohism and li-promotionalism are not entirely coterminous.

摘要

一个长期存在的正统认为，墨家把促进李（效益，利）作为最终的规范性标准，这意味着它们衡量什么是义（刚，义）或布衣（不公，不义），这取决于它是否最大化李与否. 这种正统观念至少可以追溯到约瑟夫·埃德金斯（Joseph Edkins，1859 年），他将墨子视为功利主义者和边沁的盟友。在本文中，我们将论证这种正统观念应该重新考虑，因为它与墨子的几个段落不一致。这墨家放在促进“一个强大的重量里对整个世界（天下止痢,天下之利)'是无可争议的。然而，我们争辩说，在某些情况下，墨家的道德演算在其原理或结果上与利宣传不同。这个位置通过拒绝显示出墨学和正统里-promotionalism并不完全毗连。