We introduce two types of agent heterogeneity in a calibrated epidemiological search model. First, some agents cannot afford to stay home to minimize virus exposure. Our results show that poor agents bear most of the epidemic’s health costs. Furthermore, we show that recessions are usually deeper and recoveries are faster when a larger share of agents fail to optimally adjust their behavior during the epidemic. Second, agents develop symptoms heterogeneously. We show that for diseases with a higher share of asymptomatic cases, even when less lethal, health and economic outcomes are worse. For both types of heterogeneity, economic effects are driven by a large share of the agents taking voluntary precautions to minimize virus exposure. Due to this mechanism of voluntary precautions, testing and subsequent quarantining are particularly beneficial in economies with larger shares of poor agents. In contrast, unless a health system collapse is large enough, lockdowns are quite costly for both developing and developed economies.

我们在校准的流行病学搜索模型中引入了两种类型的代理异质性。首先，一些特工不能呆在家里以尽量减少病毒暴露。我们的结果表明，贫穷的代理人承担了该流行病的大部分医疗费用。此外，我们表明，当更大比例的代理人未能在流行期间最佳地调整他们的行为时，衰退通常更深，复苏更快。其次，代理出现异质症状。我们表明，对于无症状病例比例较高的疾病，即使致命性较低，健康和经济结果也会更糟。对于这两种类型的异质性，经济影响是由很大比例的代理人自愿采取预防措施以尽量减少病毒暴露所驱动的。由于这种自愿预防机制，检测和随后的隔离在不良代理人比例较大的经济体中尤其有益。相比之下，除非卫生系统崩溃足够大，否则对发展中经济体和发达经济体来说，封锁的代价都相当高。