When theorising about disagreement, it is tempting to begin with a person's belief that p and ask what mental state one must have in order to disagree with it. This is the wrong way to go; the paper argues that people may also disagree with attitudes that are not beliefs. It then examines whether several existing theories of disagreement can account for this phenomenon. It argues that its own normative theory of disagreement gives the best account, and so, given that there is good reason to believe disagreement without belief is possible, there is good reason to think that disagreement itself is normative.

中文翻译：

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没有信念的分歧

在对分歧进行理论分析时，很容易从一个人对p的信念开始，并询问一个人必须具有什么样的心理状态才能不同意它。这是错误的方法；该论文认为，人们也可能不同意并非信仰的态度。然后检查是否有几种现有的分歧理论可以解释这种现象。它认为，它自己的规范性分歧理论给出了最好的解释，因此，鉴于有充分的理由相信没有信念的分歧是可能的，因此有充分的理由认为分歧本身是规范性的。