The following paper questions the idea behind Stephen Darwall's attempt to ground all moral obligations in a perspective that he calls “second-personal.” In a first step, I will reconstruct Darwall's argument with the aim of raising doubt over whether the moral norms that supposedly govern interpersonal interactions in fact result from their reference to a “you,” as he claims, rather than from a reference to a collectively implied “we”, as I shall go on to argue (1). Posing this question will then afford me an opportunity to look more closely at Hegel's implicit reservations about Fichte's doctrine of recognition, reservations which I find entirely persuasive (2). In a final step, I will return to Darwall's project. In my view, this project ultimately fails due to its denial of the social, and thus conflictual, character of the moral norms governing participants within the I–you relation (3).

中文翻译：

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“你”或“我们”：第二人称视角的局限性

以下论文质疑斯蒂芬·达沃尔 (Stephen Darwall) 试图将所有道德义务置于他称之为“第二人称”的观点背后的想法。第一步，我将重构 Darwall 的论点，目的是提出质疑，即所谓支配人际交往的道德规范实际上是否源于他们对“你”的引用，正如他声称的那样，而不是源于对集体的引用。暗示“我们”，正如我将继续论证的那样（1）。提出这个问题将使我有机会更仔细地审视黑格尔对费希特的承认学说的含蓄保留，我认为这些保留完全有说服力 (2)。在最后一步，我将回到 Darwall 的项目。在我看来，这个项目最终失败是因为它否认了社会性，因此是冲突的，