We investigate the computational complexity of electoral control in elections. Electoral control describes the scenario where the election chair seeks to alter the outcome of the election by structural changes such as adding, deleting, or replacing either candidates or voters. Such control actions have been studied in the literature for a lot of prominent voting rules. We complement those results by solving several open cases for Copeland\(^{\alpha }\), maximin, k-veto, plurality with runoff, veto with runoff, Condorcet, fallback, range voting, and normalized range voting.

中文翻译：

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完成难题：通过替换、添加和删除候选人或选民的控制的复杂性

我们研究了选举中选举控制的计算复杂性。选举控制描述了选举主席试图通过结构性变化（例如添加、删除或替换候选人或选民）来改变选举结果的情况。文献中已经针对许多突出的投票规则研究了此类控制行为。我们通过解决 Copeland \(^{\alpha }\)、maximin、k-否决、复数与径流、否决与径流、Condorcet、回退、范围投票和归一化范围投票的几个开放案例来补充这些结果。