We study a transportation network company (TNC) that offers on-demand solo and pooling e-hail services in an aggregate mobility service market, while competing with transit for passengers. The market equilibrium is established based on a spatial driver–passenger matching model that determines the passenger wait time for both solo and pooling rides. We prove, under mild conditions, this system always has an equilibrium solution. Built on the market equilibrium, three variants of pricing problems are analyzed and compared, namely, (i) profit maximization, (ii) profit maximization subject to regulatory constraints, and (iii) social welfare maximization subject to a revenue-neutral constraint. A comprehensive case study is constructed using TNC data collected in the city of Chicago. We found pooling is desirable when demand is high but supply is scarce. However, its benefit diminishes quickly as the average en-route detour time (i.e., the difference between the average duration of solo and pooling trips) increases. Without regulations, a mixed strategy—providing both solo and pooling rides—not only achieves the highest profit and trip production in most scenarios, but also gains higher social welfare. The minimum wage policy can improve social welfare in the short term. However, in the long run, the TNC could react by limiting the size of the driver pool, and consequently, render the policy counterproductive, even pushing social welfare below the unregulated level. Moreover, by maintaining the supply and demand of ride-hail at an artificially high level, the minimum wage policy tends to exacerbate traffic congestion by depressing the use of collective modes (transit and pooling). A congestion tax policy that penalizes solo rides promotes pooling, but may harm social welfare. However, it promises to increase both social welfare and pooling ratio when jointly implemented with the minimum wage policy.

我们研究了一家交通网络公司 (TNC)，该公司在聚合移动服务市场中提供按需单独和汇集的电子冰雹服务，同时与乘客的过境竞争。市场均衡是基于空间驾驶员-乘客匹配模型建立的，该模型决定了单独乘车和拼车的乘客等待时间。我们证明，在温和条件下，该系统总有一个平衡解。建立在市场均衡的基础上，分析和比较了定价问题的三种变体，即（i）利润最大化，（ii）受监管约束的利润最大化，以及（iii）受收入中性约束的社会福利最大化。使用在芝加哥市收集的 TNC 数据构建了综合案例研究。我们发现当需求高但供应稀缺时，汇集是可取的。然而，随着平均途中绕行时间（即单人旅行和拼车旅行的平均持续时间之间的差异）增加，它的好处会迅速减少。在没有规定的情况下，混合策略——提供单人和拼车——不仅在大多数场景中实现了最高的利润和出行产量，而且获得了更高的社会福利。最低工资政策可以在短期内改善社会福利。然而，从长远来看，跨国公司可以通过限制司机池的规模来做出反应，从而使政策适得其反，甚至将社会福利推到不受监管的水平以下。此外，通过将网约车的供需维持在人为的高水平，最低工资政策往往会通过抑制集体方式（公交和拼车）的使用而加剧交通拥堵。惩罚单人骑行的拥堵税政策促进了拼车，但可能会损害社会福利。但是，与最低工资政策共同实施时，它有望提高社会福利和统筹比率。