Several studies provide empirical evidence for sniping (i.e., waiting until the last few seconds to bid) in second-price internet auctions, particularly in auctions at eBay. This evidence was regarded as puzzling and an anomaly for an extended period: How could sniping be consistent with rational behaviour in second-price auctions, where theory predicts that bids’ timing plays no role and there is no incentive to bid less than one’s private value.

An essential contribution to this puzzling issue has been the insight by Bose and Daripa (2017) that late bidding is itself a response to the shilling. Their paper explains well late bidding for repeating auctions. However, late bidding also occurs in non-repeated auctions.

This paper aims to show that bidders can expect shilling behaviour even in non-repeated auctions, i.e., when perishables are on the counter. For this, we introduce the notion of squeezing. It describes an upstream step to the shilling to substantially reduce the seller’s risk to become the highest bidder. We rationalize the aforementioned results for non-repeated auctions by considering the squeezing strategy.

几项研究为狙击（即等到最后几秒钟出价）提供了经验证据，尤其是在eBay 的拍卖中。在很长一段时间内，这一证据被认为是令人费解和反常的：狙击如何与第二价格拍卖中的理性行为一致，其中理论预测出价时机没有作用，并且没有动机出价低于私人价值.

Bose 和 Daripa（2017 年）的见解对这个令人费解的问题做出了重要贡献，即延迟投标本身就是对先令的回应。他们的论文很好地解释了重复拍卖的延迟投标。然而，延迟出价也发生在非重复拍卖中。

本文旨在表明，即使在非重复拍卖中，即当易腐品在柜台上时，投标人也可以预期先令行为。为此，我们引入了挤压的概念。它描述了先令的上游步骤，以大幅降低卖方成为最高出价者的风险。我们通过考虑挤压策略来合理化上述非重复拍卖的结果。